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We should resume who did what:

* Massachusetts US Attorney Carmen Ortiz pushed for the prosecution

* MIT (can we be more specific?) did nothing to stop the prosecution (to say the least)

Please, continue...



Those curious about MIT's role should 1) Read Prof Hal Abelson's report http://swartz-report.mit.edu/ 2) Remember that a prosecutor does not serve the person who reported a crime or prompted an investigation. A prosecutor serves The State http://lawcomic.net/guide/?p=1423


MIT's neutrality really comes through as a badge of shame there.


That report is a shameful whitewash


You're accusing Hal Abelson of deliberately deceiving the public? Or is there a better way to interpret what you wrote?


If you look at my response below, the report does not have to be an outright lie to be a whitewash. It can deceive by omission, for example. The headline of CNN's coverage of the report was "We did not target Aaron." That's true-ish. There's a lot of room between there and the truth, which is more like "We failed to stand up to stop a bad investigation and prosecution, and now we're dodging responsibility."

Would you place all the responsibility for the report on Abelson? Or do you think Rafael Reif is responsible for setting the parameters of the report to be produced?


That's why I used the word "deceive", as you did right here as well, and so I guess my response is to repeat the question I asked above.

Do you really believe Hal Abelson was deliberately or negligently --- ie, culpably --- deceptive?

later: added clarifying word "really"


"Deceptive" is your word. I said "whitewash."

A whitewash is dissembling and deflecting and, ultimately, deceptive. Abelson, and the other authors of the report should have refused to write it.

But Reif is mostly to blame. He asked for the report, and used it to deflect blame.

Now here is where YOU are being deceptive. You are digging for "Hal Abelson is culpably deceptive." You would even prefer something stronger. That's a weak rhetorical ploy. Write it yourself if you want to read it.


"Deceptive is your word. I said 'whitewash'. A whitewash is [...] ultimately deceptive."

I don't feel like I'm so much trying to use debate tactics against you as to observe how uncomfortable even you seem to be with the idea that Hal Abelson was deliberately deceptive.


So you are completely comfortable defending the Abelson report, and find it completely honest. That's dandy.

Are you still comfortable with your comments here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4529484


Yes. And, yes. Why? What does that have to do with Abelson's report?


Do you have sources to contradict it?


Contradict what? The report amounts to "It wasn't our fault because, except for the people we won't name, and won't say what they told law enforcement, nobody here told Aaron to kill himself."

That doesn't need to be contradicted to call it weak sauce and whitewash.


Michael Pickett of the secret service who aided MIT's IT staff and security in strong arming Aaron and escalating the case and the relevant charges. His presence and influence was the main factor in pumping up the charges and gathering evidence to support them when this could and should have been a matter between the school and its student.


Aaron Swartz was not a MIT student. From the MIT report:

"Aaron Swartz was neither a member of the MIT staff, nor an enrolled student nor alumnus, nor a member of the faculty. He was a regular visitor to the MIT campus and interacted with MIT people and groups both on campus and off."


I didn't realize that. He was accessing student services allocated to him under his enrollment with the university. I won't try to litigate the case here. I see why it might be complicated by that fact.

I want to know who called in the secret service/electronic crimes division here? MIT (who's only concern was trespass) or JSTOR who might be able to enforce contract terms on MIT or a EULA on Aaron at best?


Another (rhetorical) question: did they call the secret service before or after they identified who and what was happening?


I don't know about you, but I always call the FBI when I leave my facebook open at the public library: http://www.avclub.com/article/updated-fbi-arrests-man-suspec...


What was happening at MIT was hardly equivalent to someone leaving their Facebook page open at the library.

They had some unknown person massively exceeding the limits of what they intended to offer to the public. When they used blocking methods that would stop most people, he evaded them. When they continued trying to stop him, he continued evading.

Then he entered an equipment room off limits to the public, wired equipment into the network, and hid it.

He repeatedly trespassed to check his equipment and was grabbing so much data that to stop him JSTOR cut all of MIT off from JSTOR access for a couple days while they tried to figure out what to do next. So at that point he has disrupted research at MIT and possibly put them in violation of their contract with JSTOR.

MIT is a major research center, and that research includes quite a bit of research funded by and for the Department of Defense and other government agencies. Poking that kind of thing tends to get agencies like the Secret Service called in.


The Secret Service is routinely called in for complicated computer crime cases; they are historically the federal government's computer crimes expertise center.

The fact that the case was prosecuted federally is notable, but the USSS's involvement isn't.


What's the alternative?


The supposed victim, JSTOR, dropped their civil case. If it had affected them materially, they would have been wrong to do so.


Well FUCK jstor. I want a payday.


That's a debate worth having.

My opening salvo: The point at which individuals and corporations use of cryptography can be denigrated as, "Making it hard to detect terrorist activity" is the exact point at which it becomes impossible for the individual or the corporation to meaningfully engage with law enforcement. The escalation of the rhetoric surrounding e-crimes blurs and negates our ability not only to judge appropriate penalties, general severity, but also when, how, and to whom to report these crimes.

Its very hard to even tell when and if a crime has been committed.

In such a chaotic environment it is inevitable that money and connections and influence supplant the law.


> Its very hard to even tell when and if a crime has been committed.

So what's your suggestion? Ignore the intrusion until it goes away?


If I had the ear of middle management in America's security service I'd suggest a different approach to evangelizing at a grassroots level. Let's stop pretending startups can ignore the law and make knowledge of the law a distinguishing mark in the pedigree of a startup hacker.


Are you a Markov bot?


most lawyers I know, know how to party rock.


Totally relevant.




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