While true, "There's something more profitable to attack at the moment" seems like a lousy way to handle security.

I never said moving away from SHA-1 was irrelevant. I was simply stating that they were overestimating how common the FLAME attack could be pulled off.

Flame like Stuxnet are state of the art. Highly funded state of the art. A lot of security researchers look at these things and simply say, "Are you shitting me?!"

Call me optimistic but I highly doubt we'll be uncovering a new stuxnet every single year.

> The computation power needed to break SHA-1 is higher then attacking RSA[-1024].

You better back that assertion with something. Even in the worst possible case (for SHA-1), it seems to me that SHA-1 is cheaper to collide than it is to factor a general 1024-bit integer.