> The nice thing about this is that it would be somewhat of a self-resolving problem, since it would give the holders of non-trivial patents reason to lobby for high standards for patentability.
It would also give the holders of trivial patents (and patent lawyers who want more business) reason to lobby for low standards for patentability.
No, the trivial-patent holders already have that incentive. In any case, in a direct lobbying/political conflict between IBM, GSK, Dow Chemical and whoever versus pure-play trolls, even big ones like IV, my money is on the former. The way in which a fixed levy would or could facilitate trivial-patent holders is by putting in place a revenue-collecting process (making claims on the 5% pool) which might (or might not) be smoother and more reliable than the process by which these gentlemen make their money nowadays.
It would also give the holders of trivial patents (and patent lawyers who want more business) reason to lobby for low standards for patentability.