A quote from the ruling that bugs me: "[The detention of David Miranda] is enough to suggest that it would be foolish, if not irresponsible, for plaintiffs to store truly private or confidential information on electronic devices that are carried and used overseas"
This is in the middle of a discussion of carrying lawyer-client privileged documents over the border; the judge says you should have no expectation of privacy because other countries may conduct invasive searches too. As advice, it's hard to disagree, that's where we are now; but surely two wrongs don't make a right?
It would be obviously wrong for police to confiscate your money because you were walking towards a rough part of town where you might be robbed. Yet that is the kind of logic the judge applies here; he relaxes the responsibilities of the US govt by invoking hypothetical actions by others. The example he cites was not even a normal border shakedown, but a specific action that was signed off by a government minister; do unusual acts like this change expectations of privacy in the normal course of events?
(p23, https://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/1...)
This is in the middle of a discussion of carrying lawyer-client privileged documents over the border; the judge says you should have no expectation of privacy because other countries may conduct invasive searches too. As advice, it's hard to disagree, that's where we are now; but surely two wrongs don't make a right?
It would be obviously wrong for police to confiscate your money because you were walking towards a rough part of town where you might be robbed. Yet that is the kind of logic the judge applies here; he relaxes the responsibilities of the US govt by invoking hypothetical actions by others. The example he cites was not even a normal border shakedown, but a specific action that was signed off by a government minister; do unusual acts like this change expectations of privacy in the normal course of events?