Why didn't Kodak pivot to making smartphones ? As soon as the iPhone reveal happened, any sane executive would have realized that this is what they would need to do.
Kodak had no specialization into cameras, only into camera films, let alone digital cameras. There are actually few good digital camera manufacturers in the world. Most high end camera in smartphone are from Sony or Samsung who were already specialized in electronics way before the digital camera / smartphone era.
Red tried the same without success. I'm not convinced the differentiators for photography consumers are the same as the differentiators of cameras for smartphone consumers.
The problem was that they were fundamentally a chemical and imaging company, not a consumer electronics company. That would have been a hard shift. When they tried to do consumer electronics, it was crap. Now, if they had merged with an actual consumer electronics company (see: Sony buying Konica) they might have done better.
There's quite a lot of interesting literature on this. Unfortunately the best work looks at Polaroid [1] rather than Kodak so I'm on slightly shaky ground, on the other hand I think that if Clay Christensen can point at Kodak as a exemplar of the same processes [2] it's all ok.
Anyway the issue seems to be that Polaroid (also Kodak) had what's called a razor blade business model. In Polaroids case they actually sold the cameras for the film, but they sold them cheap cheap cheap so as to encourage the use of the high margin product that they really wanted to shift - the film. Kodak went one better (sorta) by becoming a category killer in film so everyone who wanted to use a non-polaroid camera probably ended up buying Kodak film (razor blades).
There isn't really an equivalent consumable in digital, the action is in the camera (which ended up being connected to the smart phone). Now, Polaroid had consumer goods experience and consumer product R&D capability from making instamatics, and they had a management culture of investing big to create the next big thing - but even they just couldn't get past the "I'm telling you there is no business case for this" conversation in the C-suite. And here comes Clay with the Innovators Dilemma. The Polariod and Kodak executives both struggled to see past the investment cases which said things like "invest $100m to get $40m a year from efficiency savings in film manufacture, 100% for sure for ever here is proof that can't be discussed" to see "invest $20m to get $5m next year, growing 200% a year for the next 10 years maybe, I promise, honest that's what the future looks like fellas". Worse than that - investment in the digital industry would clearly kill the film industry, and the future for a digital Kodak looked radically different to the future for a film based Kodak and therefore there was a big constituency that didn't want to see their lovely chemical factories and lab based R&D shuttered in favour of a basement filled with computer geeks, also a bunch of people saw that their million $$ sales commissions for selling to corner store processors would go out of the window.
The turkeys... they do not vote for Christmas.
So the innovation cases that could have saved both companies didn't get the bucks and the rest is history. Sucks to be the shareholder left holding that stock when the veil of corporate propaganda masking the collapse finally fell. I remember a presentation from a Kodak team in about 2009 that would have convinced you that the future was indeed filled with Kodak moments spilling through everyone's life forever. Unless you actually knew what a digital camera was and how good they were then.
In the last few years a new thread of work [3] that unifies these kind of insights into a theory of innovation processes has emerged. I am a big fan but it hasn't got the kind of profile I think it should, probably because of Quantum AI Crypto flaps. It's quite instructive to use it to understand the Quantum AI Crypto stuff as well, but no one likes to hear about that because it's more fun to look at the pretty pictures I guess.
[1] Tripsas, M., & Gavetti, G. 2000. Capabilities, cognition, and inertia: Evidence from digital imaging. Strategic Management Journal, 21: 1147–1161.
[2] Christensen, C., Raynor, M.E. and McDonald, R., 2013. Disruptive innovation (pp. 20151-20111). Brighton, MA, USA: Harvard Business Review.
[3] Grondal, S., Krabbe, A.D. Chang-Zunio, M. THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY. Academy of Management Annals 2023, Vol. 17, No. 1, 141–180. https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2021.0086
