> Unfortunately for us, all the communications with the servers in question happened over HTTPS, so we could not recover any additional details from the traffic.
This is why your corporate network should MitM all TLS connections by default.
A bit further down in the same article:
"Unfortunately, this method did not allow us to intercept HTTPS traffic of Apple services (including iMessage), as iOS implements SSL pinning for this"
Only partially. As an employee I would resign from a company that insisted on MitM'ing my connections. But from the position of the article, it clearly would have been valuable to have request captures from the start rather than having to try to reproduce the malware a second time.
Is this risk analysis real? I don't believe in companies that think this is a risk at all if their box is implemented properly. If it's even possible to compromise then you have bigger problems (like your intranet not being properly secured, or the MitM setup not being sandboxed properly, or .....)
This is why your corporate network should MitM all TLS connections by default.