You are right. It is sort of similar to the "other minds" problem. There are no ironclad arguments against a car engine not being conscious, though it seems obvious. You can have more fun of this sort reading this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism
The SEP article below is probably the best I can find right now which talks about almost all viewpoints.
There is an extremely good and entertaining argument in Penrose's book Shadows of the Mind against consciousness being computational (but the book has quite a good number of flaws in its other arguments).
From a reductionist and materialistic physical standpoint we only have fundamental particles and the forces in the universe. None of these seem to be related to consciousness. It is seems magical to say that these particles then interact in complex ways to produce something fundamentally new.
David Chalmers [1], the guy who came up with the hard problem, has written a lot on this.
Thanks! I'll ask one more question while I have your attention.
The first thing I searched for on that SEP page was "Popper", because my "how do we know a car engine is not conscious" stems from trying to apply falsifiability to my intuitive notions. What I take from "other minds" is that other people's consciousness is not falsifiable; taken to its natural conclusion, it seems to me that the non-consciousness of an engine is also non-falsifiable. Which is actually pretty cool, to a philosophical simpleton such as myself :-)
So my question is: is there something I can read that specifically links concepts of consciousness to Popper-derived falsifiability ideas?
Yes. You are spot on. I am not able to find readable survey-type articles other than the Wikipedia article on solipsism, but the idea you described is kind of folk-knowledge among really good philosophers of mind.
It tackles a lot of the philosophical problems around consciousness. I haven't read the whole thing because it's very technical and not always the best written, but what I've read is kind of interesting.
The SEP article below is probably the best I can find right now which talks about almost all viewpoints.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/
There is an extremely good and entertaining argument in Penrose's book Shadows of the Mind against consciousness being computational (but the book has quite a good number of flaws in its other arguments).
From a reductionist and materialistic physical standpoint we only have fundamental particles and the forces in the universe. None of these seem to be related to consciousness. It is seems magical to say that these particles then interact in complex ways to produce something fundamentally new.
David Chalmers [1], the guy who came up with the hard problem, has written a lot on this.
[1] http://consc.net/chalmers/