Can you give an example of such a bad concept explained in Applied Cryptography vs Serious Cryptography?
Because, out of curiosity, I just downloaded both books, skimmed on both of them (having read in the past Applied Cryptography it took me less time for it of course) through first chapters (classic crypto, randomness and RSA chapters) and found that they are very similar.
So, again, do you have a proof of your statement or are you just another Schneier hater?
I don't remember there being anything downright wrong in Applied Cryptography, at least at the time it was published, although it doesn't convey a lot of the nuance that is required in implementing secure systems. But it now 30 years out of date.
Because, out of curiosity, I just downloaded both books, skimmed on both of them (having read in the past Applied Cryptography it took me less time for it of course) through first chapters (classic crypto, randomness and RSA chapters) and found that they are very similar.
So, again, do you have a proof of your statement or are you just another Schneier hater?