Why aren't companies being found criminally negligent with the CFAA when they force poison-pill "upgrades" that remove stated features from the original device?
How is this functionally different than the crypt-ransomware we see in the news?
IANAL, but contract or not, you find one government/protected computer that is connected to one of these things, and suddenly we're wading into 18 U.S.C. § 1030 territory:
> (5) (A) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer;
A malicious driver that bricks the printer might meet that criteria. The access might be authorized, but the inflicted damage isn't.
So as long as I send a target an email and they don't respond back that they refuse then I can do anything to them that was in that email - same level of "authorised". They probably looked at an email longer if it was actually opened.
The last printer I bought, I was able to setup and print with, without (explicitly) agreeing to any license. Is the EULA part of a software install process?
Why aren't companies being found criminally negligent with the CFAA when they force poison-pill "upgrades" that remove stated features from the original device?
How is this functionally different than the crypt-ransomware we see in the news?