>Is there some evidence you have of this plan? Sounds like this is just a fear you have.
The EARN IT act. It may not be Apple's plan, Apple's plan, as you suggest, might only be for doing scanning on encrypted iCloud and excluding encrypted iMessage. But what Apple will be pushed to do after that is pretty clear.
If the government passes a law mandating that encrypted messages be scanned, it won’t be done using this CSAM mechanism, and it won’t only be Apple doing it.
In short, you might be right to be afraid of this outcome, but it has nothing whatsoever to do with CSAM countermeasures.
>That, of course, is the rub: Apple controls the algorithm, both in terms of what it looks for, what bugs it may or may not have, and also the inputs, which in the case of CSAM scanning is the database from NCMEC. Apple has certainly worked hard to be a company that users trust, but we already know that that trust doesn’t extend everywhere: Apple has, under Chinese government pressure, put Chinese user iCloud data on state-owned enterprise servers, along with the encryption keys necessary to access it. What happens when China announces its version of the NCMEC, which not only includes the horrific imagery Apple’s system is meant to capture, but also images and memes the government deems illegal?
>The fundamental issue — and the first reason why I think Apple made a mistake here — is that there is a meaningful difference between capability and policy. One of the most powerful arguments in Apple’s favor in the 2016 San Bernardino case is that the company didn’t even have the means to break into the iPhone in question, and that to build the capability would open the company up to a multitude of requests that were far less pressing in nature, and weaken the company’s ability to stand up to foreign governments. In this case, though, Apple is building the capability, and the only thing holding the company back is policy.
I agree that it could be used to detect image collections (and only image collections) that are not porn, that users upload to iCloud Photo Library.
That is the only established abuse case. Apple has categorically denied that they will comply with it, just as they refused to help the FBI in the San Bernardino case.
Even if they do end up complying in China because China passed a law, authoritarianism in China is a red herring. This mechanism is of no consequence to the Chinese government.
All of has absolutely nothing to do with your claim that ‘iMessage is next’ and the article doesn’t support your claim.
The EARN IT act. It may not be Apple's plan, Apple's plan, as you suggest, might only be for doing scanning on encrypted iCloud and excluding encrypted iMessage. But what Apple will be pushed to do after that is pretty clear.