> To my ISP, NAT obscures device browsing history (assuming there are multiple people and devices within a household). To the best of my knowledge an ISP has no realistic way of engaging in mass browser fingerprinting.
There's plenty of information that an ISP could silently listen in on, e.g. user-agent header, pre-STARTTLS cipher suites. And realistically how many people are there in a household, and how much do they reflect on each other? What's the threat model where this is a realistic improvement in your privacy?
> Sure, they can likely recover some amount of information by engaging in browser fingerprinting but right off the bat it makes their job harder.
> Security and privacy both involve layers. Every bit of information leaked is a concession to an adversary.
Weak privacy measures are worse than nothing just like weak security measures. Putting in effort to obscure one or two bits is a false economy. One solid layer (e.g. Tor) will protect you far better than any number of weak layers.
> I don't believe you. Shitty software is harmed by it. If you have concrete examples to the contrary, I'm open to them.
Everything peer-to-peer is made needlessly harder, and the result is centralisation that hurts the overall internet. E.g. in a non-NAT world, hosting a multiplayer game and letting your friends join is easy; with NAT, it's hard enough that people rely on the manufacturer providing servers (which they won't do indefinitely) instead.
There's plenty of information that an ISP could silently listen in on, e.g. user-agent header, pre-STARTTLS cipher suites. And realistically how many people are there in a household, and how much do they reflect on each other? What's the threat model where this is a realistic improvement in your privacy?
> Sure, they can likely recover some amount of information by engaging in browser fingerprinting but right off the bat it makes their job harder.
> Security and privacy both involve layers. Every bit of information leaked is a concession to an adversary.
Weak privacy measures are worse than nothing just like weak security measures. Putting in effort to obscure one or two bits is a false economy. One solid layer (e.g. Tor) will protect you far better than any number of weak layers.
> I don't believe you. Shitty software is harmed by it. If you have concrete examples to the contrary, I'm open to them.
Everything peer-to-peer is made needlessly harder, and the result is centralisation that hurts the overall internet. E.g. in a non-NAT world, hosting a multiplayer game and letting your friends join is easy; with NAT, it's hard enough that people rely on the manufacturer providing servers (which they won't do indefinitely) instead.