There is similar recent technological development in missile accuracy that has changed the balance between the US and Russia to favor the US. It's completely missing the discussion when there is fret about Russian doomsday weapons. Russia needs more doomsday weapons and movable missile launchers just to match the US.
>Our conclusions. Under the veil of an otherwise-legitimate warhead life-extension program, the US military has quietly engaged in a vast expansion of the killing power of the most numerous warhead in the US nuclear arsenal: the W76, deployed on the Navy’s ballistic missile submarines. This improvement in kill power means that all US sea-based warheads now have the capability to destroy hardened targets such as Russian missile silos, a capability previously reserved for only the highest-yield warheads in the US arsenal.
>The result is a nuclear arsenal that is being transformed into a force that has the unambiguous characteristics of being optimized for surprise attacks against Russia and for fighting and winning nuclear wars. While the lethality and firepower of the US force has been greatly increased, the numbers of weapons in both US and Russian forces have decreased, resulting in a dramatic increase in the vulnerability of Russian nuclear forces to a US first strike.
Yes. MAD assumed that, even if one side launched everything and hit all it could, the other side could launch the remaining stuff and devastate the other side just as much.
First strike capability requires a time pressure that isn't as intense in MAD. For example, Russia's Dead Hand system was designed with the philosophy such that, even if America struck first, there's still enough leftover to post-mortem launch the counter-destruction. That no longer applies, so now there's tons of immediate time pressure to determine if an early-warning alert is a true or false positive.
Russian early-warning network has deteriorated. They have outdated and incomplete ground based radar systems and their satellite coverage is incomplete.
Russians deterrence focuses on the survival of their strategic command and control and retaliation after the attack. Deeper bunkers and moveable and hidden missile launchers.
Funny how based on the same facts, someone can draw completely different conclusions. This article tries hard to show that this advance in nuclear weaponry is destabilizing, while it appears to me it's a huge step in the right direction.
More precise nuclear weapons are good. It means lower yields are necessary to render hardened targets inoperable. That means in turn lower collateral damage, and reduced fallout. As even more precision is acquired, at some point non-nuclear warheads will be able to destroy the same targets. 50 years from now, we'll get to a point where MAD can be achieved fully without nuclear weapons. This may sound bad to some, but it's the only path towards full world denuclearization.
When this denuclearization will be achieved, the scientists behind these small incremental strategic weaponry improvements will deserve a collective Nobel prize for peace. I won't be holding my breath for that ...
When and because Russian's started to develop doomsday weapons.
"Status-6 Oceanic Multipurpose System" seems to be huge salted nuclear bomb similar to the the cobalt-salted doomsday bomb in the movie Dr. Strangelove. The goal of is to contaminate wast areas for long time.
"9M730 Burevestnik" is experimental nuclear powered, nuclear armed cruise missile. The US had similar crazy doomsday weapon development program (SLAM and project Pluto in the 60's). Nuclear powered ramjet is insane compared to ICBM. When you use it, you don't care abut contaminating the launch site or anything between launch site and target.
These kinds of weapons can be used only as retaliation when all hope is lost and you want to kill hundreds of millions of civilians and make wast areas inhabitable. Russian early warning system has deteriorated as well, so they need something like that.
So the unintended consequence of ballistic missile defence (which could probably do very little to stop an all out Russian attack) is that your opponent creates even worse weapons that are impervious to ballistic missile defence.
Typically for "logic" in such matter the arguments used by both sides make complete sense but the result is insanity.
The goal of the US ballistic missile defense is defend against a limited ICBM attack and regional missile threats. US ballistic missile defense program can't defend against large scale Russian attack. Defending against large scale attack has never been the goal of the program, nor is it a realistic goal.
Russians use the US BMDS it partly as an excuse. Russians can easily compensate against any BMDS development by adding little steeper arch to their ICBM's or adding more countermeasures.
Maybe they're worried about their capability to retaliate - US BMDS maybe can not defend against full Russian arsenal but it may be successful against limited retaliation (if most of Russian arsenal gets wiped out in first strike).
This does make perfect sense. They're holding up the M in MAD by creating these kinds of weapons. They're no different than ICBM subs in that they ensure the ability to strike back.
I find the comments about nuclear ramjets being dirty laughable. If you're shooting nukes you're in a situation where whether or not some area is contaminated it the least of your concerns.
> Today, ring-laser gyro INS systems with embedded GPS come in tiny packages and can sustain massive G forces allowing them to be packed into everything from missiles to artillery shells...Before GPS was available to correct for drift, it's amazing the lengths engineers went through to make inertial navigation systems as accurate as possible.
Having your nuclear deterrence depend on GPS staying operational seems...questionable.
It is indeed remarkable. At first I though it was just a collection of technology images, but then realised she made most of those devices herself. Thanks for the link.
It was aimed at Soviet missile silos - you don't need that kind of accuracy to hit "countervalue" targets (i.e. cities) - so there was perhaps some logic to it.
What's the point of 40 meters CEP in a high yield nuclear missile ? what's wrong with 400 meters ? 1 Km ?
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> Very little of the precision of this guidance system is even exploited during a ballistic missile flight, it is mostly used simply to maintain guidance system alignment on the ground during missile alert without needing an external reference through precision gyrocompassing. Most ICBMs require an external alignment system to keep the INS in synch with the outside world prior to launch
>during missile alert without needing an external reference through precision gyrocompassing. Most ICBMs require an external alignment system to keep the INS in synch with the outside world prior to launch.
Until someone with real knowledge comes along, here's my take. The INS doesn't know where it is at in relation to the rest of the world/universe/whatever. So you tell it. And the INS sits there in his missile silo, constantly asking, "where am I? Have I moved since last time I asked this question? If I've moved, where does that now place me in relationship to everything else?" Of course, he's in a missile silo, he hasn't gone anywhere. But the INS drifts; small imprecisions add up to the INS thinking it moved when it didn't. So he has to sync with an external system to figure out, "whoops, haven't moved. Better rebaseline."
Where this fancy-schmancy system is so good, you tell it where it's at once, and he can sit in his silo for years without drifting enough to need correction. Again, somewhat educated SWAG. Do not stake your reputation on this by repeating it.
That’s my understanding too. The key is that this process of baselining takes time, which you don’t have either when there’s half a dozen 50MT Russian warheads coming your way (TFA refers to the missile sites being a nuclear “sponge”, i.e. forcing the Russians to launch on them and use warheads that could be targeted against cities instead) or when you want to destroy them in a preemptive first strike before they can be launched.
Nowadays you can buy a toy quadcopter, and get a single chip gyro with on-package computer and performance of mid-cold war ICBM INS.
Microelectronics is a tough industry. Fear of communism can not match the fear of loosing to a commercial competitor in a half trillion dollar industry.
Not even close. Single chip gyros and accelerometers are many orders of magnitude less accurate. INAV with microelectronic gyros and accelerometers is pointless except for very short distances with frequent GPS corrections. Double integration is a cruel bitch.
The Bulletin has great detailed article: How US nuclear force modernization is undermining strategic stability: The burst-height compensating super-fuze https://thebulletin.org/2017/03/how-us-nuclear-force-moderni...
>Our conclusions. Under the veil of an otherwise-legitimate warhead life-extension program, the US military has quietly engaged in a vast expansion of the killing power of the most numerous warhead in the US nuclear arsenal: the W76, deployed on the Navy’s ballistic missile submarines. This improvement in kill power means that all US sea-based warheads now have the capability to destroy hardened targets such as Russian missile silos, a capability previously reserved for only the highest-yield warheads in the US arsenal.
>The result is a nuclear arsenal that is being transformed into a force that has the unambiguous characteristics of being optimized for surprise attacks against Russia and for fighting and winning nuclear wars. While the lethality and firepower of the US force has been greatly increased, the numbers of weapons in both US and Russian forces have decreased, resulting in a dramatic increase in the vulnerability of Russian nuclear forces to a US first strike.