Please explain how you can have anonimity if it can be lifted by law enforcement.

The selling point of cryptocurrencies is not being beholden to the whims of a government.

You can have limited anonymity and the option of hiding into the crowds.

To give a very crude example, a FBI backdoor key established in the genesis block could allow them to publish into the blockchain a personal information fetch request that is public and has a public field that the agency is expected to populate with relevant court order number. They could of course issue requests without that field, but in that case everyone could see their behavior and laws could be passed to make it illegal.

A further refinement would be to request a financial bond before the operation is executed. This bond could increase exponentially, guaranteeing the backdoor cannot be abused for mass surveillance and is employed for limited, high profile cases.

The "whims of a government" are often the expression of strong social forces that exist for a reason. Rejecting any form of social governance is an Utopian political construction at it's core, masquerading here as technology.

There are so many problems with your proposal it's hard to know where to begin.

I'm going to guess you're American. It might be news to you, but the rest of the world (and many Americans) don't want to be subjected to the United States government and its inane laws. You might love your government and think it does no wrong, but we don't. And it has a terrible track record.

Moreover, what are you going to do when the inevitable happens and this "supersecret backdoor key" is leaked? Your system is a ticking time bomb.

> They could of course issue requests without that field

Your "field" is useless then.

> but in that case everyone could see their behavior and laws could be passed to make it illegal.

Then what would be the point of allowing it in the first place?

> The "whims of a government" are often the expression of strong social forces that exist for a reason.

"Strong social forces" doesn't mean "good social forces". You have an incredibly naive view of how governments work if you think otherwise.

Those are straw-men against a conceptual example intended to show that a trade-off is possible. All the problems you rise have solutions in a practical system, you could issue the key to an international organization such as the INTERPOL, treaties could be set-up beforehand so only lawful use of the field is permitted, key revocation is a thing etc.

Or you could move away from a centralised governance altogether and have a stake voting system where the actual users decide to de-annonimize a particularly user. Or we can imagine a weak form of privacy where cooperation among your trading partners can reveal more and more information, a al e-cash with blind signatures, where a double spend reveals your identity.

In short, the question is if "absolutely private money transfers" are something we need and want, not if there are technical ways to gradually weaken privacy in a socially controlled fashion.

> All the problems you rise have solutions in a practical system

Hand-waving is not a valid way to address fundamental problems with your proposal.

> you could issue the key to an international organization such as the INTERPOL

Interpol? Haha, no thanks [1]. You also haven't addressed the key being leaked, which would destroy your proposed system.

> treaties could be set-up beforehand so only lawful use of the field is permitted

Yeah, that tends to work very well in the real world.

> key revocation is a thing

So who can revoke this supersecret magic key, and under what conditions? If you don't specify that, this statement is as good as meaningless.

> a stake voting system where the actual users decide to de-annonimize a particularly user

Which “actual users”? Literally everyone?

You're going to have to explain the details of your proposed deanonimization system because as it stands it's completely vague.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpol#Criticism

I'm not proposing a practical system, I'm asserting that such a system is reasonable to exist. Unless, of course, you can prove there are fundamental issues that preclude it. The imperfect nature of international law and institutions is not such an issue, but again a way stick one's head in the sand and abstract the real world away: "see, human institutions are always corrupted, so let's circumvent them and algorithmically dictate our worldview that rejects money laundry is a real problem". What could possibly go wrong?

> I'm asserting that such a system is reasonable to exist.

When every known system that meets your criteria fails, the onus is on you to show that such a system can succeed.

> The imperfect nature of international law and institutions is not such an issue

Relying on a demonstrably unreliable system, particularly where enormous power is concerned, is absolutely a fundamental issue.

> our worldview that rejects money laundry is a real problem

This is a straw man. It's like saying that anyone who doesn't believe the government should have cameras in people's homes rejects terrorism as a real problem. We're talking about tradeoffs.

I'm the one talking about trade-offs, you are of the position that any algorithmic feature designed to weaken anonymity in certain well defined scenarios is tantamount to "cameras in people's homes".

Well, Bitcoin is more traceable than Monero or Grin so there you go, a handy example of an (unintentional) trade-off that seems to work without the sky falling. It's absolutely reasonable that an intentionally designed system could achieve a more favorable trade-off, with better privacy for regular folk and less for well defined, exceptional circumstances.

What you're proposing (giving a government entity a "backdoor key") goes far beyond anything Bitcoin does.

Dusk is trying to walk this line