Apparently it wasn’t the standard autopilot trim, but a special safety program specific to the 737 MAX. Which still is just a switch to disable, if you know that switch is there, or that there is a checklist for dealing with runaway trim, or that you’re aware that auto-trim commands are the reason your plane keeps nosing down...
I think the most important point described in that article is that the MCAS trim, unlike the other kinds of elevator trim, isn't defeated by limit switches on the yoke - and that this critical information was not in the training or flight manual.
If true, then this right here is the problem root. Why isn't pilot limit respected with regard for the MCAS specifically? Are any other systems so independent?
I remember years ago the Boeing folks claiming that the automated Airbuses would be dangerous because the pilot always knows best. So how did it come to this on a Boeing?
The answer appears to be something along the lines of "because the whole point of MCAS is to stop the pilot flying the aircraft beyond the limits of stability".
Apparently it wasn’t the standard autopilot trim, but a special safety program specific to the 737 MAX. Which still is just a switch to disable, if you know that switch is there, or that there is a checklist for dealing with runaway trim, or that you’re aware that auto-trim commands are the reason your plane keeps nosing down...