You can store things as follows. Store the salted hashed password with its salt server side. When the user wants to login send them the salt and a random salt. Client side hashes the password + salt then hashes that hash with the random value. What am I missing? Probably something since this is something I rolled my own version of when I was a teenager, but it's not immediately obvious to me.
Server stores hashed-password, hash-salt, and random-salt.
Server sends hash-salt, and random-salt to client.
Client uses user password and hash-salt to generate hashed-password.
Client hashes hashed-password using random-salt.
Client sends hashed-hashed-password to server.
Server grabs stored hashed-password and hashes used stored random-salt to check for match against client's hashed-hashed-password.
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So the only thing this actually does is not share the text of the password that the user typed to the server. But at a technical level, now the hashed-password is the new "password".
Let's say the database is compromised. The attacker has the hashed-password. They make a login request to fetch the random-salt, hash their stolen hashed-password with it and send that to the server. Owned.
Along with being more complicated with no real gain, this also takes the hashing away from the server-side, which is a big negative, as the time that it takes to hash a password is a control method used to mitigate attacks.
Just send the plain-text password over HTTPS and hash it the moment it hits the server. There's no issue with this technique (as long as it's not logged!)
This is true. It does prevent an attacker from reusing a password they recover from your logs. But as others have pointed out a DB breach means all your users are compromised. Thank you.
No, random-salt is not stored permanently but generated at random by the server every time a client is about to authenticate. Alternatively a timestamp would be just as good.
The random-salt has to be stored, at least for the length of the authentication request, because the server needs to generate the same hashed-hashed-password as the client to be able to match and authenticate.
> Alternatively a timestamp would be just as good.
I don't see how that would work at all.
I also don't see the need to go any further in detail about how this scheme will not be better than the current best practices.
A timestamp would work the same way it works in (e.g.) Google Authenticator.
Incidentally, I really resent how it's impossible to have a discussion of anything at all related to cryptography on HN without somebody bringing up the "never roll your own crypto" dogma.
If the ideas being proposed are bad, please point out why, don't just imply that everyone except you is too stupid to understand.
Edit:
I just reread your comment above and you did a perfectly good job of explaining why it's a bad idea, I must have misunderstood first time round: it's a bad idea because now the login credentials get compromised in a database leak instead of a MITM, which is both more common in practice and affects more users at once.
Sorry for saying you didn't explain why it is a bad idea.
The problem with this scheme is that if database storing the salted hashed passwords is compromised, then an attacker can easily log in as any user. In a more standard setup, the attacker needs to send a valid password to log in, which is hard to reverse from the salted hashed password stored server-side. In this scheme, the attacker no longer needs to know the password, as they can just make a client that sends the compromised server hash salted with the random salt requested by the server.
> Store the salted hashed password with its salt server side.
So now _this_ is effectively just "the password", that needs to be protected, even though you're storing it server side.
If an attacker has it, they can go through the protocol and auth -- I think, right? So you prob shouldn't be storing it in the db.
All you're doing is shuffling around what "the password" that needs to be protected is, still just a variation of the original attempt in top comment in this thread.
The reason we store hashed passwords in the db instead of the password itself is of course because the hashed password itself is not enough to successfully complete the "auth protocol", without knowing the original password. So it means a database breach does not actually expose info that could be used to successfully complete an auth. (unless they can reverse the hash).
I _think_ in your "protocol" the "original" password actually becomes irelevant, the "salted hashed password with it's salt" is all you need, so now _this_ is the thing you've got to protect, but you're storing it in the db, so now we don't have the benefits of not storing the password in the db that we were hashing passwords in the first place for!
I guess your protocol protects against an eavesdropper better, but we generally just count on https/ssl for that, that's not what password hashing is for in the first place of course. Which is what the OP is about, that _plaintext_ rather than hashed passwords ended up stored and visible, when they never should have been either.
Cryto protocols are hard. We're unlikely to come up with a successful new one.
But now your password is effectively just HMAC(user_salt, pwd), and the server has to store it in plaintext to be able to verify. Since plaintext passwords in the db are bad, this solution doesn't sound too attractive, unless you were suggesting something else.
