No, the concern was that a deranged officer might launch on their own, without correct authorization and checks from another person. This resulted in the two-man rule.

When I did maintenance on our comm systems in certain areas of the base, there was always someone else with me. Entering alone meant that you would get shot (signs were up saying lethal force was authorized, and they meant it). What's more, our workcenter was divided into teams and members of each team would not be allowed to maintain equipment from the other, to prevent a single person from making unauthorized modifications to both.

Two-man was taken quite seriously.

Read the quoted passage again. "Located on separate consoles, there is no way they could be operated by one person." This was supposed to keep one rogue individual from initiating a launch.

There's been a constant tension between the desire to control nuclear weapons and the desire to ensure nuclear weapons can be used in a war. These two goals are fundamentally in conflict to an extent. For a long time, the military was more worried about being unable to use a nuclear weapon due to a breakdown in the control system than they were worried about rogue officers using a weapon without permission.

Permissive Action Links (devices in bombs which require an authentication code for the bomb to work) were resisted by the military, fearing that the codes might not be available when needed in wartime. That finally got forced on the Air Force and Army, but the Navy to this day doesn't have PALs on their weapons, because they see the risk of communications problems as being too high.

For another example, the codes for the Minuteman ICBMs were set to 00000000. They remained like this until 1977.

It's quite possible that this hardware was designed under a requirement that it would need two people to launch, but that it was deliberately engineered to make that requirement easy to bypass in case a single person needed to launch in wartime.