Thompson's work built on and was mostly predated by MULTICS security evaluation that showed subverted compilers and use of hardware failures to boost trapdoors. See bottom two links on my comment here:
Founders of INFOSEC taught us most of what we needed to know. Mainstream security prefers to ignore it, calling it unnecessary, then reinvent it one technique at a time over several decades. Least the OP paper is doing what high-security recommended which is investigating risks at transistor and analog level. Most data on that is trade secret given it's exploited for competitive advantage and intelligence agencies.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11771243
Founders of INFOSEC taught us most of what we needed to know. Mainstream security prefers to ignore it, calling it unnecessary, then reinvent it one technique at a time over several decades. Least the OP paper is doing what high-security recommended which is investigating risks at transistor and analog level. Most data on that is trade secret given it's exploited for competitive advantage and intelligence agencies.