> the fear is that they can use the same law to install backdoors in ongoing versions
There is no reasonable interpretation of the All Writs Act (which regards subpeonas) that could be interpreted to force Apple to preemptively make their OS insecure. If they include a backdoor in future versions of the iPhone, or if the FBI discovers a vulnerability, then it is entirely possible that they could use the same precedent to force them to open the backdoor for them, or even give them a metaphorical prybar for the backdoor.
But the point is that Apple is rapidly moving towards (and in their opinion, has already achieved) a hard stop -- they no longer possess the technical capability to break a locked iPhone after the 5s. For a specific case, and a specific subpoena, there is no work that Apple can do to comply with the subpoena.
And, like I said, it seems clear that Comey understands this, and is not asking Apple to weaken security in the future, and I see no indications that he is asking for that.
There is no reasonable interpretation of the All Writs Act (which regards subpeonas) that could be interpreted to force Apple to preemptively make their OS insecure. If they include a backdoor in future versions of the iPhone, or if the FBI discovers a vulnerability, then it is entirely possible that they could use the same precedent to force them to open the backdoor for them, or even give them a metaphorical prybar for the backdoor.
But the point is that Apple is rapidly moving towards (and in their opinion, has already achieved) a hard stop -- they no longer possess the technical capability to break a locked iPhone after the 5s. For a specific case, and a specific subpoena, there is no work that Apple can do to comply with the subpoena.
And, like I said, it seems clear that Comey understands this, and is not asking Apple to weaken security in the future, and I see no indications that he is asking for that.